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NOTHING PERSONAL: THE EVOLUTION OF
THE NEWEST EQUAL PROTECTION FROM
SHAW V. RENO TO BUSH V. GORE
PAMELA S. KARLAN"
In this Essay, which is a response to Robinson Everett's
Redistricting in North Carolina-A Personal Perspective, I argue
that the Shaw line of cases and the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Bush v. Gore share some critical features. Each
involves what I call "structural" equal protection. The Supreme
Court deploys the Equal Protection Clause not to protect the rights
of an identifiable group of individuals, particularly a group unable
to protect itself through the operation of the normal political
processes, but rather to regulate the institutional arrangements
within which politics is conducted. The Shaw cases and Bush v.
Gore raise quite similar issues of standing and remedies. Neither
the Shaw cases nor Bush v. Gore fully answers the question of
when, and why, courts should intervene in the deeply messy
process of partisan politics. Instead, they manifest the Supreme
Court's general disdain for the other branches and levels of
government. Finally, each adopts a distressingly narrow
perspective within which to measure equality, a perspective that
shortcircuits the normal, albeit potentially contentious and messy,
process of self-government, leaves in its wake weakened
institutions, and re-enlists equal protection in the service of less,
rather than greater, equality and democracy.
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* Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law, Stanford Law
School. As with all my work in this field, I owe many of my insights to Sam Issacharoff,
Rick Pildes, and Jim Blacksher. In addition, I thank Henry Weinstein and Viola Canales
for virtually hours of conversations on the issues raised in this piece. Portions of this
comment appear, in a different form, in Pamela S. Karlan, The Newest Equal Protection:
Regressive Doctrine on a Changeable Court, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE AND THE
SUPREME COURT (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001). These passages
appear here by permission of the University of Chicago press. Finally, in the interest of
full disclosure, I have participated in many cases involving the issues raised by Shaw v.
Reno and its progeny: Sinkfield v. Kelley, 531 U.S. 28 (2000) (per curiam); Meadows v.
Moon, 521 U.S. 1113 (1997), affg, 952 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Va. 1997) (three-judge court);
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); and United
States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995).
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INTRODUCTION
During the week of November 27, 2000, the United States
Supreme Court heard two cases involving judicial regulation of
electoral politics. The first case was Hunt v. Cromartie:1 the Court's
fifth confrontation with North Carolina's post-1990 congressional
reapportionment The second was Bush v. Palm Beach County
Canvassing Board: the Court's first encounter with the disputed
presidential election of 2000 and the counting of ballots in Florida.
3
What do these two litigations have in common? A lot more than
may be apparent to the casual reader. Both involve what I will call
"structural" equal protection. The Court deploys the Equal
Protection Clause4 not to protect the rights of an identifiable group of
individuals, particularly a group unable to protect itself through
operation of the normal political processes, but rather to regulate the
institutional arrangements within which politics is conducted. Neither
fully answers the question of when, and why, courts should intervene
in the very messy process of partisan politics. Further, each adopts a
distressingly narrow perspective within which to measure equality.
Most of the commentary about Bush v. Gore,' at least so far, has
been quite scathing.6 A common thread has been that the Court's
equal protection analysis "had no basis in precedent."7 This Article
1. 121 S.Ct. 1452 (2001).
2. The Court was hearing the second round of oral argument in Easley v. Cromartie.
See also Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999) (remanding the case for a full trial on the
merits). The Court had also issued two opinions in a prior challenge to the state's
reapportionment as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899
(1996); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). Even earlier, the Court had summarily
affirmed the rejection of a challenge to the same apportionment as an unconstitutional
political gerrymander. Pope v. Blue, 506 U.S. 801 (1992).
3. 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
4. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
5. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
6. For representative examples, see Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68 U.
CHi. L. REv. 637 (2001); Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of
Constitutional History, 89 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Order
Without Law, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 757 (2001); Mark V. Tushnet, Renormalizing Bush v.
Gore, 90 GEO. L.J. (forthcomming Nov. 2001); Jeffrey Rosen, Disgrace, NEW REPUBLIC,
Dec. 25,2000, at 18.
7. Sunstein, supra note 6; see also, e.g., David G. Savage, The Vote Case Fallout, 87
A.B.A. J. 32 (2001) (quoting Professor A.E. Dick Howard as saying "This is a remarkable
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takes a somewhat different tack. Rather than condemning Bush v.
Gore as an aberration, it criticizes Bush as the latest manifestation of
the "newest model of equal protection," the Court's Shaw
jurisprudence.' Bush v. Gore turns out to have a lot in common with
Bush v. Vera.9
As Richard Pildes perceptively notes, the "image of democracy"
that has informed the contemporary Supreme Court's interventions
into the political arena-in contexts as diverse as blanket primaries,
ballot access, and candidate debates-is a fear of too much
democracy, of too robust and tumultuous a political system.10 That
image underlies the Court's Shaw jurisprudence as well: the Court
sees itself as the only institution capable of resolving the difficult
questions raised by the role of race in American democracy. In the
Shaw cases, as in Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court has radically
transformed not only the substantive rules that govern
reapportionments and recounts, but also the vertical and horizontal
relationships among the various institutional players involved in these
intensely political activities. The former concern the connection
between the federal government and state governments: for example,
what is the extent of congressional power to regulate state elections?
The latter concern the interaction among different branches of
government: when can courts overturn the choices reached by other
branches and when should courts resolve, or pretermit, conflicts
among the other branches? And, as Bush v. Gore shows, the
institutional questions may sometimes seem almost diagonal: what is
the relationship between, for example, Article II, section 1 of the
Constitution, which provides that "Each State shall appoint" its
presidential electors "in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct,"'" the federal Electoral Count Act, which confers special
responsibilities on Congress, 2 and the powers of the Florida and
federal courts? 3  The Supreme Court's newest equal protection
use of the equal protection clause. It is not consistent with anything they have done in the
past 25 years.").
8. I use this phrase as a shorthand to describe the Court's race-conscious redistricting
cases, which began with the decision in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
9. 517 U.S. 952 (1996). Bush v. Vera is the Shaw case striking down three majority-
nonwhite congressional districts in Texas. Id. at 956-57. George W. Bush was named as a
defendant because he was the Governor of Texas.
10. Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming
summer 2001).
11. U.S. CONsr. art. II, §1, cl. 2.
12. 3 U.S.C. §§ 1-18 (1994).
13. For a more extensive consideration of these issues, see generally SAMUEL
ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, WHEN ELECTIONS Go
2001] 1347
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manifests a striking mistrust of nearly every other actor in the
reapportionment and recount processes. Forty years after the
judiciary's first significant foray into the political thicket, we find
ourselves ensnared in the political Bushes.
I. STANDING ON THIN AIR: THE "NEWEST EQUAL PROTECTION" IN
THE WRONGFUL DISTRICrING CASES
There is a deep irony in the title of Robinson Everett's
contribution to this Symposium. 14 Everett can offer a "personal
perspective" on the North Carolina experience only because he was
the lead counsel for the plaintiffs in both Shaw and Cromartie. Had
he been simply a plaintiff, he would have virtually nothing "personal"
to say and no distinctive "perspective" to offer; as a matter of law, the
distinctive qualities and experiences of plaintiffs in the Shaw cases are
entirely irrelevant."5 All that matters is that the plaintiffs live in the
district they challenge. 6 To be sure, the other named plaintiffs in
Shaw and Cromartie make a brief appearance in the text or footnotes
of Everett's article, but what do we learn about them? That Everett
knew each of them for a long time.17 That Ruth Shaw had been a
plaintiff in one of the early one-person, one-vote lawsuits. 18 That
Martin Cromartie lives in Tarboro and has known Everett for almost
fifty years.' 9 Was there anything that singled out these individuals
from all their neighbors who were also allocated among the state's
twelve congressional districts? Actually, we learn one other thing
about this deracinated quintet: although each of them was white, this
BAD: THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2000 (rev. ed.
2001) [hereinafter BAD ELECTIONS].
14. Robinson 0. Everett, Redistricting in North Carolina-A Personal Perspective, 79
N.C. L. REV. 1301 (2001).
15. The most pointed example of this fact arose in one of the Florida Shaw cases,
Johnson v. Mortham, 926 F. Supp. 1460 (N.D. Fla. 1996) (three-judge court). In that case,
the plaintiffs successfully resisted being deposed by defendant-intervenors on the ground
that the plaintiffs had no discoverable information about the lawsuit they had initiated.
Email from Brenda Wright, attorney for Defendant-Intervenors, to Pamela S. Karlan,
Professor of Law, Stanford University Law School (Feb. 5, 2001 10:10:19) (on file with
author and the North Carolina Law Review).
16. For more extensive discussions of Shaw standing, see Sinkfield v. Kelley, 531 U.S.
28 (2000); United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995); John Hart Ely, Standing to
Challenge Pro-Minority Gerrymanders, 111 HARv. L. REV. 576 (1997); Samuel Issacharoff
& Pamela S. Karlan, Standing and Misunderstanding in Voting Rights Law, 111 HARv. L.
REV. 2276 (1998); Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in the
Post-Shaw Era, 26 CtJMB. L. REV. 287,289-99 (1996) [hereinafter Still Hazy].
17. Everett, supra note 14, at 1310 n.51.
18. Id
19. Id. at 1322 n.96.
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fact was omitted from the complaint because the plaintiffs "did not
believe it to be relevant."'2  But their race is relevant-not necessarily
to their legal claim, but rather in explaining how it is that people who
had lived for decades in North Carolina could be more upset by the
creation of the state's first majority-black congressional districts in
the twentieth century than they had been by the preceding century's
lily-white congressional delegations.21 Why is Everett so distressed by
the deliberate creation of two districts-in neither of which does he
live-that enable black voters to elect the candidates of their choice?
Why does he describe the districts drawn after Shaw v. Hunt as "fruit
of the poisonous tree" designed to assure that persons with "dirty
hands" would retain their "spoils,"' while using far more measured
language to describe the maneuvering designed to protect white
incumbent Harold Cooley in the 1960s?13 The race of the Shaw
plaintiffs is relevant as well to my broader point: that the newest
equal protection, unlike its predecessor, is far more solicitous of the
interests of individuals who are fully capable of protecting their
interests within the broader political processes. Everett points to
nothing that suggests that proponents of a color-blind interpretation
of the Equal Protection Clause have been unable to promote their
view within the normal reapportionment process. They simply lost
out to a national consensus in favor of the Voting Rights Act's
consciously multiracial image of American democracy and to political
realities within the North Carolina General Assembly.2 4
In United States v. Hays,' the Supreme Court noted that "the
irreducible constitutional minimum of standing" requires that "the
plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury in fact'-an invasion of a
legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and
(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical" and that "it
must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will
20. Id. at 1311.
21. For a more extensive discussion of this ahistoricism, see Chandler Davidson,
Racial Gerrymandering Across the Centuries: A Reply to Professor Everett, 79 N.C. L.
REV. 1333 (2001).
22. Everett, supra note 14, at 1322.
23. Id. at 1305-06. It is also interesting to note that Everett's participation in the
litigation surrounding the post-Drum v. Seawell redistricting was spurred by his friendship
with a putative candidate.
24. Those realities led the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately to uphold North Carolina's
1997 redistricting against a renewed Shaw challenge because the Court held that politics,
not race, was the predominant factor explaining the configuration of the Twelfth District.
See Easley v. Cromartie, 121 S. Ct. 1452,1458-66 (2001).
25. 515 U.S. 737 (1995).
2001] 1349
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be redressed by a favorable decision. '26 Attempting to categorize the
Shaw plaintiffs' injury in fact, Everett writes that the plaintiffs "felt
disenfranchised by the legislature's creation of the Twelfth
[Congressional] District.
27
Certainly, disenfranchisement is an injury in fact; however there
is no pre-existing definition of "disenfranchisement" that describes
the Shaw plaintiffs' situation. Feeling disenfranchised is not the same
thing as being disenfranchised. Each of the Shaw and Cromartie
plaintiffs was able to go to the polls and to cast a ballot for the
candidate of his or her choice.28 So they weren't "disenfranchised" de
jure in the way that citizens who could not pass North Carolina's
literacy test had been.2 9 The two Shaw plaintiffs who lived within the
original Twelfth District in fact voted in the general election for the
winning candidate.30 So they were not "disenfranchised" de facto in
the way that voters whose preferred candidates are consistently
defeated at the polls by racial bloc voting3' have been.
In fact, despite the invocation of images of disenfranchisement,
the real character of the Shaw cases is not a claim about voting rights
at all. As I have explained elsewhere, the right to vote embodies a
nested constellation of concepts: participation (the entitlement to
cast a ballot and have that ballot counted); aggregation (the choice
among rules for tallying votes to determine election winners); and
governance (the ability to have one's policy preferences enacted into
law within the process of representative decisionmaking), 2 The Shaw
26. 1& at 742-43 (internal citations omitted).
27. Everett, supra note 14, at 1310.
28. Cf City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65 (1980) (plurality opinion)
(announcing that African-American voters could not state a claim under the Fifteenth
Amendment because they were able to "register and vote without hindrance").
29. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1959)
(upholding North Carolina's literacy test against constitutional attack). In Gaston County
v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 291 (1969), the Supreme Court noted that North Carolina's
history of relegating black citizens to inferior segregated schools "deprived them of an
equal chance to pass the literacy test."
30. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 16, at 2278 n.16.
31. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 48-51 (1986) (explaining how racial bloc
voting denies minority voters an equal opportunity to elect representatives of their
choice). For extensive discussions of the history of racial discrimination in North
Carolina's political process, see WILLIAM R. KEECH & MICHAEL P. SIsTROM, North
Carolina in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS
AcT 1965-1990, at 155-90 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994); J.
MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE
UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 243-76 (1999).
32. Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights To Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71
TEX. L. REv. 1705,1707-08 (1993).
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plaintiffs were not advancing a claim under any of these concepts?.
3
Rather, they were pressing a claim involving what we might call
"meta-goveruance," that is, a claim about the rules by which the
democratic political processes are structured.' It was a claim that the
very use of race in the process of redistricting was divisive and
harmful.
3 1
Notice, however, that this claim does not distinguish the Shaw
plaintiffs from all other citizens of North Carolina, or, indeed, of the
United States. The claim that race played too great a role in the
redistricting process is a paradigmatic example of "a generally
available grievance about government-claiming only harm to ...
every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and
laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits
[the plaintiffs] than it does the public at large."36 The Shaw plaintiffs
are advancing a shared, individuated "right to a Government that
obeys the Constitution."'37
Normally, this sort of interest does not confer Article III
standing. Rather, it "gives support to the argument that the subject
matter is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to
the political process" rather than to the judiciary. 8 With the notable
exception of claims under the Establishment Clause,39 the Court's
general response is that when everyone has been affected equally by a
33. At a couple of points in his article, Everett suggests that one could have made a
hybrid aggregation-governance claim regarding North Carolina's plan: the ultimate effect
of drawing majority-black districts in his view is "to polarize Congress by making it more
difficult for moderate white Democrats to be elected." Everett, supra note 14, at 1311
That issue is one to which Chandler Davidson's contribution responds in part. Davidson,
supra note 21, at 1333-34; see also Pamela S. Karlan, Loss and Redemption: Voting Rights
at the Turn of a Century, 50 VAND. L. REV. 291 (1997) (discussing the "bleaching"
hypothesis). Everett disclaims such an intent regarding the motivation for the Shaw and
Cromartie lawsuits-that is, he denies that these lawsuits are partisan political litigation
dressed up as race-discrimination claims-and I take him at his word.
34. See Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court's Voting Rights
Trilogy, 1993 Sup. Cr. REV. 245,286.
35. See Everett, supra note 14, at 1312-13.
36. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,573-74 (1992).
37. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,754 (1984).
38. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974). Richardson denied
standing to a plaintiff who claimed that the budget secrecy statute he challenged
prevented him from "properly fulfill[ing] his obligations as a member of the electorate in
voting for candidates seeking national office." Id at 176. The Court rejected the idea that
the "Founding Fathers intended to set up something in the nature of an Athenian
democracy or a New England town meeting to oversee the conduct of the [challenged
process] by means of lawsuits in federal courts." Id at 179. According to the Court, a
"citizen who is not satisfied with the 'ground rules' established by the Congress" still has
"the right to assert his views in the political forum or at the polls." Id.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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governmental decision, no one has standing: these are precisely the
cases in which the political process can be trusted to handle
individuals' claims.
As I have explained before, the Court's minimalist approach to
standing in the Shaw cases conveys the critical message that these
cases "really aren't individual rights lawsuits in the first place. Rather
they concern the meaning of 'our system of representative
democracy.' "40 The Shaw cases are about our vision of democracy:
what is the role of colorblindness as opposed to the role of full and
equal participation of racial minorities in pluralist politics? When
should courts step in because race has played too great a role? What
deference ought the Supreme Court accord the judgments of
Congress in enacting and amending the Voting Rights Act of 1965
and the executive branch in implementing the preclearance process?
For all their equal protection rhetoric, the wrongful distric-
ting cases are instead really addressed to what Justice
Thomas has termed the "political landscape of the Nation."
The Court has smuggled into the equal protection clause a
decision that really speaks to what constitutes a republican
form of government in multiracial twentieth-century
America.4'
Now consider the final "irreducible" element of standing-that
the plaintiffs' injury "will be redressed by a favorable decision."42
How, precisely, are the Cromartie plaintiffs injured by the Supreme
Court's decision to uphold the redrawn Twelfth District? Everett's
own account does not provide a very clear answer. The complaint he
originally filed in Shaw claimed that the use of race in the redistricting
process violated a constitutional right to "a color-blind electoral
process." 43 The Supreme Court decisively rejected the existence of
such a right: race-conscious redistricting is permissible, either when it
comports with traditional districting principles,44 or when it is
necessary to comply with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, itself a race-
40. Still Hazy, supra note 16, at 296-97 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 650
(1993))).
41. Id. at 297-98 (quoting Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 894 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
concurring)).
42. United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737,742-43 (internal citations omitted).
43. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 641-42 (quoting complaint paragraph 29).
44. If a district's configuration reflects traditional districting principles-and query
what precisely those are-then strict scrutiny is not even triggered in the first place. See
Easley v. Cromartie, 121 S. Ct. 1452 (2001); SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN




conscious statute.45 Thus, in Cromartie, the district court upheld the
First Congressional District, despite the overt race-consciousness that
went into its creation.46  Moreover, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that districting will never be "race-neutral" in the way
Everett desires: "[R]edistricting differs from other kinds of state
decisionmaking in that the legislature always is aware of race when it
draws district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status,
religious and political persuasion, and a variety of other demographic
factors." 47 At most, what the Shaw litigation has achieved is more
regularly shaped districts, and Everett provides no independent
justification for why pleasingly shaped districts are superior.
Compactness is one often useful criterion for assessing districts,
but there are many other values as well. Everett offers no reason why
compactness is more important than other values. The Shaw
litigation achieves esthetic regularity at significant cost. Judicial
endorsement of the Shaw plaintiffs' conception of democracy
necessarily entails judicial repudiation of the vision of democracy
expressed by the normal majoritarian political process. To
paraphrase now-Chief Justice Rehnquist's youthful observation
regarding the White Primary Cases:
[t]o the extent that this decision advances the frontier of
... 'social gain,' it pushes back the frontier of freedom of
association and majority rule.... [I]t does not do to push
blindly through towards one constitutional goal without
paying attention to other equally desirable values that are
being trampled on in the process.48
The redistricting plan that the Shaw Court struck down was
supported by North Carolinians, black and white, who thought it was
important for the state to create congressional districts that gave
black citizens an equal opportunity to elect the representatives of
their choice; was enacted by a majority in a fairly elected state
legislature; and was approved by the executive branch of the federal
government pursuant to the authority conferred by a congresionally
enacted statute that rests on the consensus that the Fourteenth and
45. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 642; Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,976 (1996).
46. The district court's opinion, which is unreported, is excerpted in SAMUEL
ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN, & RICHARD H. PILDEs, THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 136, 145-47 (Supp.
2001).
47. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 646.
48. Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist to Justice Robert Jackson regarding
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), reprinted in LAW OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 44, at
92-93.
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Fifteenth Amendments are best enforced by taking race into account,
rather than by color-blindness.4 9 "Self-government, whether direct or
through representatives, begins by defining the scope of the
community of the governed and thus of the governors as well"; thus,
judicial involvement in redistricting "may interfere with those aspects
of democratic self-government that are most essential to it."50 The
Voting Rights Act and the various political realities of contemporary
redistricting define self-government in ways that take into account
America's racial and ethnic diversity, its history of exclusion, and
current realities of racial polarization. The approach taken by
Everett and his colleagues rejects self-government in favor of judicial
imposition of one, very contestable, vision of what equality means.
While I think that the Supreme Court finally got it right when it
upheld the redrawn Twelfth District in Hunt v. Cromartie II, its
decade-long intervention in North Carolina's redistricting process was
nonetheless harmful. In the short run, the Supreme Court's
expressed skepticism about the bona fides of the Department of
Justice and the various state legislators who participated in
redistricting may undermine the public's sense of confidence in the
integrity of other governmental actors. In the long run, the
roadblocks the Court has thrown in the way of achieving effective
desegregation of political office risk undermining the legitimacy of a
monoracial government for a multiracial society. Contemporary
redistricting under the Voting Rights Act may well be "a device for
regulating, rationing, and apportioning political power among racial
... groups." 51 Any multi-ethnic nation, however, in which political
cleavages often break along racial lines must have some such device.
One might think, from all their invocation of "balkanization, ' '52 that
the Justices might have noticed that two generations of communist
suppression of ethnic and religious tension in Yugoslavia did little to
ensure stability, tolerance, or integration. It is worth remembering
the question Langston Hughes asked a half-century ago: "What
happens to a dream deferred?" 53 The Voting Rights Act, and the self-
49. For example, section 2 of the Voting Rights Act expressly states that "[t]he extent
to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political
subdivision is one circumstance that may be considered" in deciding whether the political
processes are equally open to minority voters." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994).
50. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432,439-40 (1982).
51. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874,893 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
52. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 912 (1995); Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997,
1030 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Holder, 512 U.S. at 905 (Thomas, J., concurring in
the judgment); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 657.
53. Langston Hughes, Harlem (Montage of a Dream Deferred), in THE COLLECTED
1354 [Vol. 79
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conscious and deliberate racial integration of American politics it has
produced, began finally to redeem the promise of the Fifteenth
Amendment. The Act has been, as Lyndon Johnson predicted, "one
of the most monumental laws in the entire history of American
freedom." 54 I don't think it is an exaggeration to say that the Act
helped to prevent America from exploding in the kind of ethnic
violence that has characterized so many other contemporary nations.
Seventy years ago, the great Legal Realist Jerome Frank warned
that we tend to view the world too much through our personal
experiences:
Every man is likely to overemphasize and treat as
fundamental those aspects of life which are his peculiar daily
concern. To most dentists, you and I are, basically, but teeth
surrounded by bodies. To most undertakers we are incipient
corpses; to most actors, parts of a potential audience; to
most policemen, possible criminals; to most taxi drivers,
fares. "The Ethiopians," wrote Xenophon, "say that their
gods are snub-nosed and black-skinned, and the Thracians
that theirs are blue-eyed and red-haired. If only oxen and
horses had hands and wanted to draw with their hands or to
make the works of art that men make, then horses would
draw the figures of gods like horses and oxen like oxen, and
would make their bodies on models of their own." Spinoza
suggested that if triangles had a god it would be a triangle.
We make life in the image of our own activities.
Although there is nothing "personal" about being a plaintiff in a
wrongful-districting case, something about Everett's analysis is
profoundly personal. Its focus on the sentiments of individual voters
and its assumption that the building blocks of the American political
order are abstract, universalized individuals, rather than the diverse,
distinctive, and yet overlapping groups into which we organize
ourselves reflects a partial, in both senses of the word, perspective.
From my admittedly different perspective, the problem with Everett's
account is what he would trumpet as its virtue: precisely that it is
color-blind. Everett sees that stance as a refusal to employ an
irrelevant and illegitimate factor. I see it as a failure to acknowledge
POEMS OF LANGSTON HUGHES 426 (Arnold Rampersad & David Roessel eds., 1995)
(1951) ("What happens to a dream deferred?I/Does it dry up/like a raisin in the sun?/Or
fester like a sore/And then run?/Does it stink like rotten meat?/Or crust and sugar
over/like a syrupy sweet? /Maybe it just sags/like a heavy load.llOr does it explode?").
54. DAVID GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE
VOTING RIGHTS Acr OF 1965, at 132 (1978) (quoting Lyndon B. Johnson).
55. Jerome N. Frank, Accounting for Investors, The Fundamental Importance of
Corporate Earning Power, 68 J. Accr. 295, 295-96 (1939).
13552001]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
a complex and inescapable reality. In my view, race has played, and
continues to play, a variety of critical roles in American politics.
II. SKATING ON THIN ICE: THE "NEWEST EQUAL PROTECTION" IN
BUSHV. GORE
For those of us who spent much of the 1990s preoccupied with
Shaw v. Reno and its progeny, Bush v. Gore had an aspect of deja vu
all over again. It raised quite similar issues of standing, remedies,
judicial respect for the states and the political branches, and the
framework within which to assess equal protection claims.
The central question in Bush v. Gore was the constitutionality of
a Florida Supreme Court decision ordering a manual recount of
certain ballots in the agonizingly close presidential election. 6 The
Florida Supreme Court directed: (1) that the state's popular vote
total be adjusted to add additional votes for Al Gore identified in a
full manual recount in Palm Beach County and a partial manual
recount in Miami-Dade County;57 (2) that the trial court conduct a
recount of approximately 9,000 as-yet unreviewed "undercount"
ballots from Miami-Dade County;58 and (3) that the trial court order
the county canvassing boards in all other counties that had not yet
conducted a manual recount of their undervotes to do so as well.59 In
conducting these recounts, the Florida Supreme Court directed the
counters to use the standard "established by the Legislature in our
Election Code which is that the vote shall be counted as a 'legal' vote
if there is 'clear indication of the intent of the voter.' "60
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that "Florida's basic
command ... to consider the 'intent of the voter' "61 was
"standardless"62 and a violation of the Equal Protection Clause "in
the absence of specific standards to ensure its equal application." 63
The Court rested its holding in part on an acknowledgment that "the
standards for accepting or rejecting contested ballots might vary not
only from county to county but indeed within a single county from
56. For a fuller account of the various events, see Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000);
Gore v. Harris, 772 So.2d 1243 (Fla. 2000); 36 DAYS: THE COMPLETE CHRONICLE OF
THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CRISIS passim (Douglas Brinkley ed., 2001).
57. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1248.
58. Id. at 1262.
59. Id.
60. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 101.5614(5) (2000)).
61. Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. at 530.
62. Id. at 529.
63. Id at 530.
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one recount team to another. ' Thus, who examined a ballot might
determine whether that ballot was counted.'5
In addition, the Court found an equal protection violation in the
different treatment accorded to "undervotes" (ballots on which
machine tabulation had failed to detect a vote for President) and
"overvotes" (ballots which the tabulating machines rejected because
there was more than one vote cast for a presidential candidate):
As a result [of this different treatment], the citizen whose
ballot was not read by a machine because he failed to vote
for a candidate in a way readable by a machine may still
have his vote counted in a manual recount; on the other
hand, the citizen who marks two candidates in a way
discernable by the machine will not have the same
opportunity to have his vote count, even if a manual
examination of the ballot would reveal the requisite indicia
of intent. Furthermore, the citizen who marks two
candidates, only one of which is discernable by the machine,
will have his vote counted even though it should have been
read as an invalid ballot.'
Given these problems, which rendered the recount as ordered
unconstitutional, and its view that the problems could not be cured
within the available time,67 the Supreme Court "reverse[d] the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida ordering a recount to
proceed," 68 effectively ending the election.69
Just as in the Shaw cases, it is worth asking what the precise
constitutional injury was, and who suffered it. With respect to the
problem of different standards for deciding a previously-uncounted
ballot's validity, there are two easily understandable potential injuries
in fact. First, a voter whose ballot was not counted in the initial
64. Id. at 531.
65. The Court gave a concrete example of this problem: "Broward County used a
more forgiving standard than Palm Beach County, and uncovered almost three times as
many new votes, a result markedly disproportionate to the difference in population
between the counties." Id
66. Id
67. The question of the precise time available is beyond the scope of this commentary.
Suffice it to say, the question whether the recount had to be completed by December 12,
2000-the date mentioned in the Supreme Court's opinion-or whether there was in fact
more time is among the many controversial aspects of the Supreme Court's decision.
68. Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. at 533.
69. While George W. Bush was clearly the winner, given that he was ahead in the
count when time was called, his margin of victory was not entirely clear. While the U.S.
Supreme Court seemed to see equal protection problems with respect to the already
completed full recounts in Broward and Palm Beach counties, see iL, it did not explicitly
require that votes added through those processes be excluded.
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machine count, but whose ballot would be recovered under the
"liberal" standard applied by, for example, Broward County, or by an
"inclusionary" counting team, might claim an injury if her ballot were
to be rejected because she lived in a county like Palm Beach County
that employed a more stringent standard or had her ballot examined
by a counting team with a more "exclusionary" approach. This
allegation has the structure of a classic equal protection claim.
70
Second, a voter whose preferred candidate received disproportionate
support in "stringent" counties might claim that she had less of an
ability to elect the candidate she preferred than would a voter whose
candidate's support was concentrated in "liberal" counties, because
liberal-county-preferred candidates are more able to recapture votes
through a manual recount. For example, suppose the counties with a
liberal standard were disproportionately Democratic while the
counties with a stringent standard were disproportionately
Republican. A Republican voter anywhere in the state might then
suffer an injury in fact because his preferred candidate's supporters
would be less likely to have their ballots counted. In either event,
assuming for the sake of argument that the recaptured votes were
legally cast in the first instance 7 the equal protection claim with
respect to the recount standards72 inheres in voters who claim that their
votes, or the votes of the bloc of which they are members, are less
likely to be captured manually than other citizens' votes.
A somewhat different set of potential injuries in fact flows from
the Florida Supreme Court's directive to recount undervotes, but not
to recount overvotes. First, the citizen who cast an overvote but
whose intent was clear is injured. Her overvote will not be re-
examined in the manual recount process.73 As a result, she is denied
the opportunity to have her vote recovered that is accorded to
citizens who cast undervotes. If overvoters and undervoters whose
70. I leave aside here the question whether such different treatment would ultimately
occur, given unified judicial review of the county-conducted manual recounts.
71. Thus, I set aside the claims of some Republicans that Democratic-controlled
canvassing boards were either treating ballots differently if the potentially recoverable
vote was for Gore than if it was for Bush and of other Republicans that the recovered
votes were not legal votes as a matter of Florida law.
72. I highlight this phrase because it will turn out that there is another important
potential equal protection claim ignored by the Supreme Court's decision. See infra notes
90-95 and accompanying text.
73. This category turns out to have a significant, perhaps decisively significant,
number of voters. See Mickey Kaus, Election 2000: The Race Tightens Up, SLATE, Jan.
28, 2001, available at http://slate.msn.com/code/KausFiles/KausFles.asp?Shbw=1/28/2001




intentions are equally clearly discernible are similarly situated, and I
have no reason to doubt that they are, they have been treated
unequally. Second, if it could be shown that the supporters of a
particular candidate were more likely than other voters to cast
recoverable overvotes, then supporters of that candidate might suffer
a cognizable injury since their candidate's relative inability to recover
votes in the recount process would make it less likely that their voting
bloc would succeed. These two claims, of course, resemble the claims
available to voters challenging the different standards for recapturing
undervotes. But according to the Supreme Court, there is a third
potential problem with the failure to re-examine overvotes: this
might allow invalid votes to be counted, since "the citizen who marks
two candidates, only one of which is discernable by the machine, will
have his vote counted even though it should have been read as an
invalid ballot." 74
This third category is problematic and distinctive. It is
problematic, because it does not in fact exist. The problem identified
by the Supreme Court arises from a failure to re-examine all ballots
and not from a failure to re-examine overvotes. By hypothesis, after
all, these ballots are unidentifiable as overvotes: they were counted,
improperly as it turned out, in the mechanical process. No amount of
re-examining overvotes would identify this category.
More significantly, this injury is distinctive, because it concerns
the only category of ballots identified by the Supreme Court as to
which other voters are necessarily injured by their inclusion in the
official count. The injury-in-fact occurs because voters who cast valid
ballots have the value of their votes diluted by the inclusion of these
invalid ballots.75 With respect to each of the other injuries, by
contrast, the injury is produced by the exclusion of valid votes.
One striking thing about the Supreme Court's opinion in Bush v.
Gore is that it doesn't distinguish these analytically different injuries.
But its general tone seems to focus largely on the claims of individual
excluded voters, rather than on voters whose preferred candidate was
potentially disadvantaged by the recount the Florida Supreme Court
ordered. Perhaps this was a tactical decision by the majority, which
sought to avoid having its decision appear partisan: to say that the
injury was suffered only by Republican voters whose overall voting
strength was diluted by the recount standard would have made
74. Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. at 531.
75. See Roe v. Alabama, 43 F.3d 574 (11th Cir. 1995) (identifying the inclusion of
illegally cast ballots as a cognizable injury); BAD ELECrIONS, supra note 13, at 17.
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explicit that this was a case about partisan outcomes rather than
abstract principles. But if the injuries the Supreme Court sees are the
exclusion of valid undervotes by stringent counties and exclusionary
counting teams and the exclusion of valid overvotes by an incomplete
recount process, who has standing to raise these claims?
George W. Bush? Why? He is not an excluded voter himself.
So unless he has third-party standing, he is not a proper champion of
the excluded voters' claims. Moreover, unless and until the Supreme
Court is prepared to say that his supporters are disproportionately
likely not to have their votes recovered under the prescribed process,
he is an especially unlikely candidate for third party standing. It is
hard to see George W. Bush as the champion of a claim by
undervoters in overwhelmingly Democratic Palm Beach County that
they are being denied equal protection because their votes would
have been included under the more liberal Broward County standard.
Indeed, Bush's third-party complaint in Gore v. Harris-the source of
his intervention in the case which the Supreme Court decided as Bush
v. Gore-alleged, among other things, that the standard used in
Broward County was partisan, inconsistent, and unfair. The relief he
sought was a declaration that "the illegal votes counted in Broward
County under the new rules established after the election should be
excluded under the Due Process Clause and 3 U.S.C. § 5."76 Nothing
in that proposed remedy vindicates the rights of excluded voters in
Palm Beach County or elsewhere except in the brute realist sense that
they might be content to have their votes excluded if that means that
a disproportionate number of votes by the other candidate's
supporters gets excluded as well.
I examined the pleadings filed by the other parties in Gore v.
Harris to see what they claimed their injuries to be.77 There were
three groups of voters who intervened. Stephen Cruce, Teresa Cruce,
Terry Kelly, and Jeanette K. Seymour were registered voters who
lived in West Florida7 The Cruces voted by absentee ballot, and
76. Third-Party Complaint of Defendants George W. Bush and Dick Cheney, Gore v.
Harris 40 (filed Dec. 2, 2000), available at http://election2000.stanford.edu/cv-00-
2802bs.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
77. Intervenor John E. Thrasher sought to participate in his capacity as an elector
pledged to George W. Bush. His argument centered on the questions whether Gore had
standing to contest the election in the first place and whether the Florida Supreme Court's
recount order violated Art. II, § 1 of the Constitution. See Presidential Elector John E.
Thrasher's Motion to Intervene (filed Dec. 2, 2000), available at http://election2000.
stanford.edu/cv-00-2808be.pdf under Gore v. Harris (last visited Oct 1, 2001) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review). Thus, I do not discuss his arguments in the text.
78. Motion to Intervene in Election Contest by Stephen Cruce, Teresa Cruce, Terry
Kelly, and Jeanette K. Seymour (filed Nov. 27, 2000), available at
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Kelly and Seymour did not cast ballots at all, ostensibly because, on
the way to the polls, they heard media reports that Gore had carried
Florida, and "became convinced that [their] vote[s] would be
meaningless."79  They alleged a host of misconduct by election
officials in various counties, ranging from the improper exclusion of
military absentee ballots or votes cast for Bush to the illegal inclusion
of ballots that did not manifest a voter's clear intent. In addition,
they alleged that felons had been illegally permitted to vote, and that
premature media reports of Gore's victory-released while the polls
were still open in the Florida Panhandle (which is on Central, rather
than Eastern, Standard Time)-unreasonably interfered with
Panhandle residents' right to vote and debased and diluted the overall
voting strength of the Panhandle.80 Leaving aside the claims based on
the media's effect on voter turnout, as to which I cannot even begin to
identify a legally cognizable injury, the nature of the intervenors'
arguments was somewhat opaque.8' In any event, however, they
distinguished themselves from the candidate-parties (Bush, Gore,
Cheney, and Lieberman) in the following terms: "[Our] view of the
2000 presidential election in Florida comes from a statewide
perspective, and [our] concerns lean toward the legitimacy and
constitutionality of the election process, more than to [our] own
preference of who ought to win."'
Put this way, their injury looks exactly like the real objection
advanced by the Shaw plaintiffs: a "shared individuated right to a
Government" that obeys the Constitution.83 Nothing about their
situation distinguishes them from any other voter in Florida. They
are not raising participation-based or aggregation-centered interests.84
http://election2000.stanford.edu/gore-v-harris.112700.pdf. (last visited Oct. 1, 2001) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
79. led at 5-6.
80. Id. at 8.
81. By the time the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the Cruce intervenors' key
claim seemed to be that the problem with the recount ordered by the Florida Supreme
Court was that it potentially denied voters who chose not to cast a vote in the presidential
election their right against compelled speech. See Brief for Respondent/Intervenors
Stephen Cruce, Teresa Cruce, Terry Kelly, and Jeannette K. Seymour in Support of
Petitioners in Bush v. Gore, Bush v. Gore Section, at 10-13 (filed Dec. 10, 2000), available
at http://election2000.stanford.edu/crucein.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2001) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review). But none of the Cruce intervenors was denied that right:
two of them did not vote at all, and claimed that the denial of their right to vote was the
injury they had suffered, see supra note 78 and accompanying text, and the other two just
as clearly chose not to exercise that right, since they did cast votes for president.
82. Id. at 3.
83. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,754 (1984) (internal quote omitted).
84. In their motion to intervene, the Cruce intervenors did allege that "Due to the
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They are not claiming that the actual outcome of the election process
fails to reflect their choice among the candidates. Rather, they are
raising meta-governance claims.
The other intervenors did raise more individuated claims. Matt
Butler, a voter in Collier County, voted for George W. Bush. He
intervened because, as a voter in a punchcard community whose votes
were not being manually recounted, he had "no way of knowing for
sure whether or not his vote was in fact counted by the machine ......
Butler alleged that:
the Presidential votes in a few Florida counties specifically
selected by Gore are being given special treatment, by being
manually examined for "voter intent" as to the vote (if any)
for a Presidential candidate (and thereafter being counted
for a candidate), as opposed to those ballots otherwise not
tallied as to any Presidential vote by a machine count
because no clear evidence of any Presidential vote was
machine-detected. This results in a subjective process to
which no ballots in Collier County, or in any other of the
approximately sixty-three counties not selected by Gore,
were or are being treated.85
In a similar vein, voters Glenda Carr, Lonnette Harrell, Terry
Richardson, Gary Shuler, Keith Temple, and Mark Thomas
intervened to seek a declaratory judgment striking down those
portions of the Florida election code that allowed a candidate to pick
the counties in which he would seek a manual recount. They claimed
that this selection device would allow a candidate to seek recounts in
only those counties where he would be likely to pick up votes. This
ability to pick and choose, "without consideration of other counties
which have discredited or 'undervoted' ballots" violated the rights of
voters in those counties whose returns were not re-examined.86
news media's unreasonable interference with Florida's election, those citizens ... who cast
their votes in Central Time Zone counties suffered a debasement and dilution of their
votes because, at that time, they reasonably expected their individual votes would be
supported and strengthened by votes from their fellow voters of similar political views
from those same counties. Instead, the strength of the vote from Panhandle counties for a
particular candidate was diluted and debased." Motion to Intervene I 8(d). But there is
no conceivable remedy for such an injury--even if the First Amendment does not bar
liability altogether. They alleged no aggregation-based injury with regard to ballots
actually cast.
85. Intervenor Matt Butler's Response to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to
Motions to Intervene at 2-3 (filed Dec. 1, 2000), available at
http://election2000.stanford.edu/cv-oo-02802bi.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2001) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
86. See Emergency Petition for Declaratory Judgment that the Florida Statutory
Scheme for a Manual Recount is Unconstitutional and Motion to Dismiss the Complaint
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Butler and the Carr intervenors raise a plausible injury-in-fact
that sounds in equal protection. But what is the appropriate remedy
for their claims? The most sensible remedy obviously is to re-
examine ballots in the counties where they voted as well. The equal
protection right of individual voters to participate can really be
vindicated only by expanding the scope of the prescribed recount.
The only equal protection right that can be vindicated by abolishing
recounts altogether is a group-based aggregation interest 87 that
depends on the partisan composition of the unrecovered pool,
precisely the issue the Supreme Court seemed to want to avoid by
couching its discussion in individualistic, atomistic terms. As I have
pointed out elsewhere, equal protection rights generally are
expansive, rather than restrictive:
The general assumption in contemporary equal protection
law, which seems to play out most of the time, is that faced
with a finding of unconstitutionality, the state will remedy
the inequality by providing the benefit to the previously
excluded group (that is, by "levelling up") rather than by
depriving the previously included group ("levelling down").
The few examples in ordinary equal protection of levelling
down-the closing of the schools in Prince Edward County,
Virginia, or the swimming pools in Jackson, Mississippi-
stand out precisely because of their raritys8
The Supreme Court, however, did not order a conventional
equal protection remedy. Instead Bush v. Gore
is essentially a leveling down case: since Florida could not
conduct a manual recount that comported with the Supreme
Court's definition of equal protection within the constricted
time period, the Court held essentially that none of the as-
yet uncounted votes should be included. From the tactical
perspective of candidate Bush, this was of course an
acceptable solution. But which voters had cognizable
interests that were vindicated by the Court's decision? Is
to Contest Election at 3-4 (filed Nov. 29, 2000), available at http://election2000.
stanford.edu/cv-00-2808w.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review); see also Motion for Order Allowing Intervention 14 (filed Nov. 30, 2000)
(alleging that having manual recounts "in the counties unfairly selected by the Gore-
Lieberman candidacy destroys their right to due process and equal protection of the law,"
and further claiming that "the statutory scheme for manual recounting allows the losing
candidates to intentionally and unfairly skew the election results thereby diminishing the
weight of Petitioners'/Intervenors' right to vote").
87. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34 (discussing the distinction between
participation and aggregation interests).
88. Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 2001,2027 (1998).
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there any voter who is better off than she was before in a
sense that the legal system can or should recognize? 89
My answer to that rhetorical question from our casebook on the
election is basically "no." Whatever interest the Supreme Court's
decision vindicated, it was not the interest of an identifiable individual
voter. Rather it was a perceived systemic interest in having recounts
conducted according to a uniform standard or not at all. It was
structural equal protection, just as the Shaw cases have been.
The second substantial similarity between Shaw and Bush v.
Gore has to do with the excessively narrow frame within which the
Supreme Court assesses equality. In the Shaw cases, the Court
focuses on the claims of individual voters to the exclusion of claims
about race-conscious districting's contributions to the achievement of
effective political equality for minority communities. 90 In Bush v.
Gore, the problem lies in the Court's myopic focus on potential
unequal treatment in the manual recount process. The per curiam
opinion acknowledged that one purpose of the manual recount
process was to vindicate a right to vote that might not be adequately
protected by the machine count,91 but it never really confronted the
magnitude of the inequalities produced in the first instance by
Florida's use of different voting technologies in different parts of the
state. The Broward County recount discerned votes on about twenty
percent of the undervoted ballots, while the Palm Beach County
recount, using a more stringent standard, recovered votes on about
ten percent of the undervoted ballots.9  But as noted political
scientist Henry Brady points out, while the disparity between the
Broward and Palm Beach standards is troubling:
it pales in comparison with the difference in the undervotes
from using the Accuvote optical scanning devices versus the
older punch card systems. The Accuvote devices (used in 16
Florida counties) have an undervote rate of about three per
thousand which amounts to 18,000 undervotes statewide if
Accuvote were used everywhere. The punch card systems
(used in 24 counties) have an undervote rate of about fifteen
per thousand which amounts to about 90,000 undervotes if
applied statewide. The difference is 72,000 votes-more
than ten times the difference between the [number of votes
potentially recoverable under the] Broward and Palm Beach
County standards.
89. BAD ELECrIONS, supra note 13, at 169-70.
90. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
91. Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525,530 (2000) (per curiam).
92. Henry E. Brady, Equal Protection for Votes (Dec. 11, 2000) (on file with author).
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But that is not all. Different voting machines lead to
different numbers of total overvotes (those ballots where the
tabulating machine detects two or more votes for the same
office). The overvote rate for the Accuvote devices is about
three to four per thousand which amounts to 21,000 votes if
applied statewide. The overvote rate for the punch card
machines is about twenty-five per thousand which amounts
to 150,000. The difference between these two vote
recording systems would be 129,000 votes-more than
twenty times the difference between the Broward and Palm
Beach County standards.
By any reckoning, the machine variability in undervotes
and overvotes exceeds the variability due to different
standards by factors of ten to twenty. Far more mischief, it
seems, can be created by poor methods of recording and
tabulating votes than by manual recounts.93
In light of these huge disparities, it simply will not suffice for the
Supreme Court to ignore the larger equal protection problem. That is
why the most outrageous passage in Bush v. Gore is the following:
The recount process, in its features here described, is
inconsistent with the minimum procedures necessary to
protect the fundamental right of each voter in the special
instance of a statewide recount under the authority of a
single state judicial officer. Our consideration is limited to
the present circumstances, for the problem of equal
protection in election processes generally presents many
complexities.
The question before the Court is not whether local
entities, in the exercise of their expertise, may develop
different systems for implementing elections. Instead, we
are presented with a situation where a state court with the
power to assure uniformity has ordered a statewide recount
with minimal procedural safeguards.94
A Court that believes that the real problem in Florida was the
disparities in the manual recount standards, rather than the disparities
in a voter's overall chance of casting a ballot that is actually counted
for the candidate for whom he intended to vote, has strained at a gnat
only to swallow an elephant.
Moreover, it has done so in a way that will continue to
disadvantage the already disadvantaged. There is credible evidence
93. Id
94. Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. at 532.
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that systems that disproportionately reject votes both have a racially
disparate impact95 and are more often used in the populous
jurisdictions in which minority voters are concentrated.96 Thus, the
newest equal protection once again vindicates the interests of middle-
class, politically potent voters, while ignoring the interests of the
clause's original beneficiaries.
Finally, Bush v. Gore, like the Shaw cases, manifests the U.S.
Supreme Court's general disdain for the other branches and levels of
government. It is hard to see the U.S. Supreme Court's opinions as
anything other than contemptuous and suspicious of the Florida
Supreme Court. Moreover, the Supreme Court also seemed not to
think that either the Florida Legislature, using its powers under
Article II of the federal Constitution, or the United States Congress,
using its powers under the Electoral Count Act,97 was capable of
policing the Florida election process. Once again, as it did in the
Shaw cases, the Court intervened to short circuit the normal, albeit
potentially contentious and messy, process of self-government. The
Court's decision left in its wake weakened institutions. The newest
equal protection turns out to complete the reconception of equal
protection begun by the Reapportionment Revolution of the 1960s.
But as Robert Frost once remarked, "the trouble with a total
revolution... [i]s that it brings the same class up on top.""8 Both the
Shaw cases and Bush v. Gore re-enlist equal protection in the service
of less, rather than greater, equality and democracy.
95. See Roberts v. Wamser, 679 F. Supp. 1513 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (finding a
disproportionate racial impact in St. Louis's punchcard voting system), rev'd on other
grounds, 883 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that the plaintiff did not have standing
under the Voting Rights Act).
96. See Brady, supra note 92.
97. 3 U.S.C. §§ 1-18 (1994).
98. ROBERT FROST, A Semi-Revolution, in THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST 363
(Edward Connery Lathen ed., 1971).
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